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PER CURIAM.1 
                                              
1 In response to Appellant John Doe’s Petition for En Banc 
Rehearing (which also requests panel rehearing, a 
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 This appeal presents an unusual question of appellate 
jurisdiction: May we continue to exercise jurisdiction over an 
appeal of an evidentiary ruling in a grand jury proceeding 
even after the grand jury has returned both an indictment and 
a superseding indictment?  We conclude that, so long as the 
grand jury investigation continues, we retain jurisdiction and 
thus can resolve the controversy.    
 
 With jurisdiction, we turn to an important question 
involving the limits of the exception to the confidentiality 
normally afforded to attorney work product.  It loses 
protection from disclosure when it is used to further a fraud 
(hence the carve-out is called the crime-fraud exception).  
The District Court stripped an attorney’s work product of 
confidentiality based on evidence suggesting only that the 
client had thought about using that product to facilitate a 
fraud, not that the client had actually done so.  Because an 
actual act to further the fraud is required before attorney work 
product loses its confidentiality and we know of none here, 
we reverse.   
I. 
 Company A, John Doe, his lawyer, and Doe’s business 
associate are the subjects of an ongoing grand jury 
investigation into an allegedly fraudulent business scheme.2  
After the Government obtained access to an email Doe claims 
                                                                                                     
presumption in any event under Third Circuit Internal 
Operating Procedure 9.5.1), the panel grants panel rehearing, 
vacates its earlier opinion, and issues this opinion. 
 
2 We use pseudonyms to refer to the grand jury subjects to 
protect the secrecy of the grand jury investigation and the 
anonymity of the subjects. 
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was privileged, it asked the District Court for permission to 
present it to the grand jury.  The Court granted permission, 
finding that, although the email was protected by the work-
product privilege, the crime-fraud exception to that privilege 
applied.  Doe then filed an interlocutory appeal, requesting 
that our Court reverse the District Court’s order.    
 
 While the appeal was pending, the grand jury viewed 
the email in question.  It then indicted Doe, his lawyer, and 
Doe’s business associate for conspiracy to violate the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(“RICO”), conspiracy to commit fraud, mail fraud, wire 
fraud, and money laundering.  Thereafter the grand jury was 
discharged and a new grand jury was empaneled.  It too saw 
the disputed email, and in December 2016 returned a 
superseding indictment that did not contain new charges but 
revisions to the previous ones.  The grand jury investigation, 
however, continues still.  What follows fleshes out this factual 
and procedural backdrop. 
 
  Doe was the sole owner of Company A and its 
president.  Nonetheless a November 2008 document purports 
to memorialize Doe’s sale of 100% of the shares of Company 
A to Company B for $10,000.  Doe’s business associate is the 
sole owner of Company B.  Following this purchase 
agreement, Doe claims that the business associate engaged 
Doe to be responsible for Company A’s day-to-day 
operations.  However, numerous filings and tax documents 
suggested that Doe maintained control and ownership of 
Company A even after Doe’s stock in it was purportedly 
transferred. 
 
 Over the last decade and a half multiple individuals 
have sued Doe and his businesses in state courts around the 
country based on Doe’s business practices.  One such lawsuit 
was a class action filed against Company A in Indiana state 
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court.  In it the plaintiffs alleged that Company A’s business 
practices violated various Indiana state laws.  They sought to 
hold Doe accountable for these violations.  However, during 
this litigation Doe stated in a deposition in 2014 that he had 
transferred ownership of Company A to Company B.  Doe’s 
business associate then represented that Company A was no 
longer in business and had limited assets.  Shortly after Doe’s 
deposition, the Indiana plaintiffs settled their claims for 
approximately $260,000, about 10% of the value attorneys for 
the plaintiffs had put on them. 
 
 Thereafter the Government empaneled a grand jury to 
investigate Doe and his business associate.  Its theory is that 
Doe owned Company A but tricked the plaintiffs into 
thinking that he had sold it to his business associate to 
encourage the plaintiffs to settle for a lower value.  This relies 
on the premise that Doe has deep pockets but his business 
associate does not. 
 
 In the course of its investigation, the grand jury 
subpoenaed Doe’s accountant requesting that he provide the 
Government with Doe’s personal and corporate tax returns.  
Among other things, these tax documents revealed that Doe 
had claimed 100% ownership of Company A every tax year 
from 2008 through 2012.  The accountant also told an IRS 
agent that, at some time in 2013, Doe’s lawyer informed him 
that Doe had sold Company A in 2008.  He also informed 
investigators that he might have taken notes on this 
conversation.  The Government requested them, and the 
accountant’s attorney sent the Government three documents. 
 
 One of the documents was an email Doe had sent to 
the accountant on July 16, 2013, forwarding an email that 
Doe’s lawyer had sent to Doe four days earlier that referenced 
an ongoing litigation.  The attorney email advises Doe of the 
steps he needed to take to correct his records so that they 
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reflect that the business associate, not Doe, owned Company 
A since 2008.  When Doe forwarded this email to his 
accountant, he simply wrote: “Please see the seventh 
paragraph down re; my tax returns.  Then we can discuss 
this.”  There is no evidence that Doe ever amended his returns 
or did anything else, apart from forwarding the email, to 
follow up on his attorney’s advice.  Indeed, the accountant’s 
recollection is that Doe’s attorney later said not to go through 
with the amendments by telling the accountant to “stand by” 
for further guidance.  It never came.   
 
 The day after the accountant provided this email to the 
Government, the accountant’s attorney sought to recall it on 
the ground that it was privileged and had been inadvertently 
included in his client’s production.  The accountant’s counsel, 
however, also told the Government that his client believed the 
email was asking the accountant to perform an accounting 
service, not a legal service.  The Government argued that 
under these circumstances Doe waived any privilege that 
might have otherwise attached to his lawyer’s email.  It did, 
however, temporarily refrain from presenting it to the grand 
jury and asked the District Court in January 2015 for 
permission to do so, which Doe opposed.   
 
 The Court ruled in the Government’s favor.  Its 
rationale was that Doe did not forward the email to his 
accountant to seek legal advice.  Lacking that precondition, 
no attorney-client privilege attached to the document.  
However, the Court did find that the attorney work-product 
privilege attached to the email because the accountant could 
not be considered an adversary.  It then concluded that the 
crime-fraud exception to the work-product privilege applied.  





 Immediately after the District Court made its decision, 
Doe filed an interlocutory appeal requesting that we reverse 
its order.  As noted above, while the appeal to our Court was 
pending the grand jury saw the email and later returned a 17-
count indictment charging Doe, his lawyer, and Doe’s 
business associate with RICO conspiracy, conspiracy to 
commit fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering.   
 
 We requested supplemental briefing from the parties 
on whether Doe’s appeal was moot in light of the indictment.  
We also asked the Government to inform us whether the 
grand jury had been discharged.   In response, it explained 
that the grand jury had been discharged shortly after it 
returned the indictment.  The Government also informed us 
that a new grand jury had been empaneled, was investigating 
new charges against Doe and others, and it was considering a 
superseding indictment.  Accordingly, both Doe and the 
Government asserted that the appeal was not moot due to the 
continuing investigation (though the Government still 
challenged our jurisdiction3).  We issued an opinion holding 
that we lacked jurisdiction, and Doe sought rehearing.  
                                              
3 It argued that the collateral order doctrine does not supply a 
basis for appellate jurisdiction.   We agree.  The doctrine 
allows us to hear an appeal of an interlocutory order that “(1) 
conclusively determine[s] the disputed question; (2) 
resolve[s] an important issue completely separable from the 
merits of the action; and (3) [is] effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from a final judgment.”  Bines v. Kulaylat, 215 F.3d 
381, 384 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The third requirement cannot be met here because “flawed 
grand jury proceedings can be effectively reviewed by [our] 
court and remedied after a conviction has been entered and all 
criminal proceedings have been terminated in the district 




 Following the rehearing petition, the Government 
changed its mind and contends that Doe’s appeal is now 
moot.  It has informed us that it showed the disputed email to 
the new grand jury in September 2016 (before the initial 
opinion of our panel issued), and the grand jury returned a 
superseding indictment in December 2016 (after our initial 
opinion).  However, that grand jury is still investigating other 
charges relating to ownership of Company A, though the 
Government represents that it currently has no plans to seek 
additional charges based on the email.   
II. 
 
 This appeal thus presents a novel procedural fact 
pattern that complicates the issue of our appellate jurisdiction.  
Generally, courts of appeals have jurisdiction over “final 
decisions” of the district courts.  28 U.S.C. § 1291.  But 
“[w]hen a district court orders a witness—whether a party to 
an underlying litigation, a subject or target of a grand jury 
investigation, or a complete stranger to the proceedings—to 
testify or produce documents, its order generally is not 
considered an immediately appealable final decision under 
§ 1291.”  See In re Grand Jury (ABC Corp.), 705 F.3d 133, 
142 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal alterations, citations, and 
quotation marks omitted).  Thus disclosure orders are not 
final and cannot typically be challenged by an immediate—
that is, interlocutory—appeal. 
 
  To obtain immediate appellate review of a disclosure 
order, the order’s target must ordinarily comply with what is 
known as the “contempt rule”: he “must refuse compliance, 
be held in contempt, and then appeal the contempt order.”  Id. 
                                                                                                     
F.2d 1033, 1039 (3d Cir. 1980).  As we discuss below, 
however, a different doctrine confers appellate jurisdiction.   
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at 142-43 (citations and quotation marks omitted).  The party 
may immediately appeal a district court’s contempt order 
because it is a final judgment imposing penalties on the 
willfully disobedient party in what is effectively a separate 
proceeding.  Id. at 143.  
 
 However, in Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 
(1918), the Supreme Court carved out an exception to the 
contempt rule.  It applies when a “disinterested” third party 
controls a privilege holder’s documents and is ordered to 
produce them.  See ABC Corp., 705 F.3d at 138.  Because the 
third party is unlikely to risk contempt to obtain an immediate 
appeal, and because the privilege holder may not refuse to 
obey a court order to which he is not subject, Perlman allows 
the privilege holder to take an immediate appeal.  Id.  
 
 In this context, Perlman provided appellate jurisdiction 
at the beginning of our case.  The email before us was 
produced in response to a subpoena addressed exclusively to 
Doe’s accountant, who “lack[s] a sufficient stake in the 
proceeding to risk contempt.”  Id. at 145.  Indeed, the 
accountant gave the email to the Government without telling 
Doe, so Doe was “powerless to avert the mischief.”4  Id. at 
                                              
4 The Government, in opposing rehearing, now argues that 
Perlman does not apply because it already had possession of 
the document from the accountant and the District Court 
merely permitted the grand jury to read it.  Thus “[n]obody 
ever faced a threat of contempt.”  Pet. Reh’r. Opp. at 6.  True 
enough, there was no threat of contempt because Doe never 
had the opportunity to challenge or prevent the accountant’s 
production to the Government in the first place. But if 
Perlman permits a privilege holder to sue immediately 
without the threat of contempt in play because that holder 
cannot himself disobey a disclosure order not directed at him, 
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144 (quoting Perlman, 247 U.S. at 13).  The Government 
contends, however, that we should no longer exercise 
jurisdiction because the first grand jury returned an 
indictment and the succeeding grand jury returned a 
superseding indictment.   
 
 The grand jury proceedings have yet to conclude, 
however.  On at least two occasions we have continued to 
exercise jurisdiction even after grand juries returned 
indictments.  In the first case, the Government appealed an 
adverse ruling on a grand jury subpoena.  At the outset of the 
appeal, our jurisdiction was clear because Congress had 
specifically given the Government the right to seek 
immediate review.  See In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(Johanson), 632 F.2d 1033, 1040 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 3731).  As the appeal was pending, however, the 
grand jury returned an indictment.  We nonetheless concluded 
that, as long as the indictment did not render the appeal moot, 
we had jurisdiction to reach the merits.  Because in that case 
the indictment “did not bring the grand jury’s proceedings to 
[their] conclusion,” a live controversy remained and our 
jurisdiction was intact.  Id.    
 
 The second decision, which involved Congressman 
Chaka Fattah and was issued less than two years ago, is even 
more compelling because it, like our case, arose because of 
Perlman.  At the time Fattah filed his Perlman appeal, he 
was, like Doe, being investigated by a grand jury.  Just as in 
our case, his status changed when the grand jury, after oral 
arguments in our Court but before we reached a decision, 
returned an indictment.  See In re Search of Elec. Commc’ns 
in the Account of chakafattah@gmail.com at Internet Serv. 
                                                                                                     
the lack of a contempt threat here does not take this principle 
out of play.   
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Provider Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 516, 521 n.2 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(“Fattah”).  However, because his appeal related to the still-
ongoing review of his emails (thus giving us a live 
controversy), we continued to exercise jurisdiction per 
Perlman even after the indictment.  Id. at 529–30. 
 
 Sound judicial efficiency concerns underlie our 
Johanson and Fattah decisions and weigh in favor of 
continuing to exercise jurisdiction even post-indictment.   
When we are able to dismiss an appeal for lack of jurisdiction 
as soon as it is filed, the process continues uninterrupted in 
the trial court, and we are able to wait until all the appellate 
issues are wrapped up after a final judgment.  But because in 
limited circumstances we take pre-indictment appeals and 
begin to decide them, we should not reflexively dismiss those 
appeals—wasting the parties’ effort as well as ours—simply 
because an indictment is filed.  Instead, if grand jury 
proceedings continue, we may still exercise jurisdiction in 
order to remedy future harm.   
 
 Consider our case, which has been on our docket since 
June 2015.  By the time Doe was indicted nearly ten months 
had passed, and the parties had fully briefed the case and 
presented oral arguments to us.  If we then send the case back 
to the District Court on the rationale that our jurisdiction was 
pulled by the indictment, we would do so with it likely that 
the issue would return if there is a conviction.  And if Doe is 
convicted and files an appeal, the parties will need to re-brief 
and re-argue the same issue that we could have resolved 
already.  Thus in cases where we accept an appeal when it is 
filed, efficiency favors finishing what we started.    
 
 To be sure, an intervening indictment can (and often 
will) moot an interlocutory appeal.  For instance, through this 
appeal Doe asks us to prevent the grand jury from relying on 
an email that he argues is confidential.  If after the indictment 
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the grand jury investigation had ended, any harm from 
exposure to the email already would have occurred.  It would 
make sense in those circumstances to hold off until after the 
criminal proceedings are over before determining whether the 
grand jury proceeding were tainted.     
 
 But those are not our facts.  The grand jury 
investigation continues, even after the new grand jury saw the 
email and issued a superseding indictment.  Although the 
Government contends that the “grand jury easily can continue 
investigating questions relating to the ownership of [Doe’s 
company] without reexamining the email or considering any 
charges related to the email,” it may yet return another 
indictment based on the issue of the company’s ownership—
the very subject of that email.  Gov’t 28(j) Letter (Dec. 29, 
2016).  The grand jury cannot erase from its memory an email 
about Company A’s ownership while evaluating new charges 
relating to that issue.  And though the Government contends it 
currently “has no plans” to put this email to further use during 
the continuing investigation, there is no guarantee that its 
plans will not change.  Pet. Reh’g Opp’n at 4.  Therefore, in 
our case, as in Johanson, these two indictments “did not bring 
the grand jury’s proceedings to [their] conclusion,” so there is 
still potential harm we can prevent.  Johanson, 632 F.2d at 
1040.  The purpose of this appeal thus remains the same as 
when it was first filed: deciding whether an email that was 
inadvertently disclosed may be used as part of an ongoing 
grand jury investigation when that disclosure plausibly 
violates the attorney work-product privilege.   
 
 As long as we had jurisdiction at the outset, Doe’s case 
is guided by our analysis of the Government’s appeal in 
Johanson and by our decision in Fattah.  As in those cases, 
the indictment and superseding indictment did not destroy 
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jurisdiction that properly existed beforehand.5  If the 
controversy is live enough that the case is not moot, we 
should decide it.   
III. 
 Having concluded that our appellate jurisdiction 
continues, we now address the merits and hold that the crime-
fraud exception to the attorney work-product doctrine does 
not apply to the email at issue.  One of the exception’s two 
requirements—the use of the communication in furtherance 
of a fraud—is lacking.  The use-in-furtherance requirement 
provides a key safeguard against intrusion into the attorney-
client relationship, and we are concerned that contrary 
reasoning erodes that protection.  
 
 Without the crime-fraud exception allowing the 
Government to show it to the grand jury, the email from 
Doe’s lawyer is protected by the attorney work-product 
doctrine.  That doctrine (often referred to as a privilege from 
or exception to disclosure), which is a complement to the 
attorney-client privilege, preserves the confidentiality of legal 
                                              
5 The Government also contends this appeal is moot for an 
unrelated reason.  It argues that Doe has waived attorney-
client protections because his pretrial memorandum indicates 
that he might rely on the advice-of-counsel defense.  See 
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 609 F.3d 143, 
164 (3d Cir. 2010) (recognizing that attorney-client 
confidentiality protections may be waived if the client asserts 
a defense based on his reasonable reliance on the attorney’s 
advice) (citation omitted).  We disagree.  That Doe’s trial 
strategy has changed given the development of this case does 
not mean he has waived the issues he continues to challenge 
on appeal.  
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communications prepared in anticipation of litigation.  
Shielding work product from disclosure “promotes the 
adversary system by enabling attorneys to prepare cases 
without fear that their work product will be used against their 
clients.”  Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Phil., 951 
F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir. 1991).  Though Doe waived the 
attorney-client privilege by forwarding the email to his 
accountant, the document still retained its work-product status 
because it was used to prepare for Doe’s case against those 
suing him.  See id. 
 
 Yet work-product protection, though fundamental to 
the proper functioning of the legal system, is not absolute.  As 
relevant here, the crime-fraud exception operates to prevent 
the perversion of the attorney-client relationship.  It does so 
by allowing disclosure of certain communications that would 
otherwise be confidential.  “[A] party seeking to apply the 
crime-fraud exception must demonstrate that there is a 
reasonable basis to suspect (1) that the [lawyer or client] was 
committing or intending to commit a crime or fraud, and (2) 
that the . . . attorney work product was used in furtherance of 
that alleged crime or fraud.”  ABC Corp., 705 F.3d at 155. 
 
 The Government can readily satisfy the first 
requirement.  Though ultimately it will be up to a jury to 
determine whether Doe committed fraud, there is at least a 
reasonable basis to believe he did.  Even setting aside the 
email, the Government has a recording where Doe allegedly 
brags about defrauding the class action plaintiffs in the 
Indiana suit.  He purportedly admits in that recording to 
telling his associate—the same one who was supposed to 
have already purchased Company A—“I’ll pay you ten grand 
a month if you will step up to the plate and say that you [own 
the company] and upon the successful completion of the 




 This evidence is strong, but it is not sufficient by itself 
to pierce the work-product protection.  We have been clear 
that “evidence of a crime or fraud, no matter how compelling, 
does not by itself satisfy both elements of the crime-fraud 
exception.”  In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 166 (3d Cir. 
2011).  Rather, the second requirement—use in furtherance—
exists for the same reason that certain conspiracy statutes 
require proof that a defendant engaged in an overt act to 
further the crime.  In both settings we want to make sure that 
we are not punishing someone for merely thinking about 
committing a bad act.  Instead, as Justice Holmes noted in the 
conspiracy context, we ask for evidence that the plan “has 
passed beyond words and is [actually] on foot.”  Hyde v. 
United States, 225 U.S. 347, 388 (1912) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting).  
 
 To illustrate, if a client approaches a lawyer with a 
fraudulent plan that the latter convinces the former to 
abandon, the relationship has worked precisely as intended.  
We reward this forbearance by keeping the work-product 
protection intact.  If, by contrast, the client uses work product 
to further a fraud, the relationship has broken down, and the 
lawyer’s services have been “misused.” In re Grand Jury 
Investigation, 445 F.3d 266, 279 (3d Cir. 2006).  Only in that 
limited circumstance—misuse of work product in furtherance 
of a fraud—does the scale tip in favor of breaking 
confidentiality.   
 
 Here the only purported act in furtherance identified 
by the District Court was Doe forwarding the email to his 
accountant.  If he had followed through and retroactively 
amended his tax returns, we would have no trouble finding an 
act in furtherance.  Even if Doe had told the accountant to 
amend the returns and later gotten cold feet and called off the 
plan before it could be effected, there might still be a case to 
be made.  That is because the Government “does not have to 
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show that the intended crime or fraud was accomplished, only 
that the lawyer’s advice or other services were misused.”  Id. 
(quoting In re Public Defender Serv., 831 A.2d 890, 910 
(D.C. 2003)).   
 
 But none of that happened.  Doe merely forwarded the 
email to the accountant and said he wanted to “discuss” it.  
There is no indication he had ever decided to amend the 
returns, and before the plan could proceed further the lawyer 
told the accountant to hold off.  Thus Doe at most thought 
about using his lawyer’s work product in furtherance of a 
fraud, but he never actually did so.  What happened is not so 
different than if Doe merely wrote a private note, not sent to 
anyone, reminding himself to think about his lawyer’s 
suggestion.  The absence of a meaningful distinction between 
these scenarios shows why finding an act in furtherance here 
lacks a limiting principle and risks overcoming confidentiality 
based on mere thought. 
 
 The District Court gave two reasons for its conclusion 
that Doe used his lawyer’s work product in furtherance of a 
fraud.  First, it suggested that Doe, in forwarding the email to 
his accountant, “took [his lawyer’s] advice” about amending 
the tax returns.  J.A. 16.  It is not clear what the Court meant 
by this because, as it acknowledged, Doe “never followed 
through with amending” the returns.  Id.  Second, the Court 
said that the failure to follow through “is of no consequence” 
as long as Doe intended, as of the time he forwarded the 
email, to amend the returns.  Id.  This is no doubt an accurate 
statement of the law.  See ABC Corp., 705 F.3d at 155.  The 
problem is that there is simply no record evidence suggesting 
that Doe had ever made up his mind. 
 
 None of this should suggest that, in the event Doe is 
convicted (based on the superseding indictment) and appeals, 
he should automatically get a new trial because the 
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Government used the protected work product.  That is 
because the Government could avoid a retrial by showing the 
error was harmless.  Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 
487 U.S. 250, 255–56 (1988).  We express no opinion on that 
question.   
 
* * * * * 
 Many appeals involving grand jury proceedings will 
become moot after the return of an indictment.  But the 
presence of a new grand jury that is continuing to investigate 
even after issuing a superseding indictment makes this case 
out-of-lane.  As a live controversy remains, an indictment 
does not automatically preclude us from deciding it.  When 
we do so, we conclude that the crime-fraud exception to the 
attorney work-product privilege does not apply to the email at 
issue.  We therefore reverse the decision allowing the breach 
of that privilege. 
